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INSTITUTIONAL VEHICLES FOR PLACE-SHAPING IN 
REMOTE AUSTRALIA: AN EXPLORATION OF 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
 
ABSTRACT: Some local communities in remote Australia represent the most socio-economically and 
socially disadvantaged immpoverished people in Australia, with the problem especially acute amongst 
Aboriginal Australiansand Torres Strait Islanders. From a public policy perspective, effective remedial policy 
intervention through active place-shaping in these communities is often undermined by the absence of 
democratically elected local institutions of government. Place-shapingPlace- shaping as a developmental 
process that enables local people to become agents of change, and thereby self determine, shape and make their 
places for the future. This process poses especially acute challenges in remote Australia, large partssignificant 
portions of which are unincorporated by local government, and thus have no de facto local democratic voice. 
This papermanuscript considers the different institutional structures which could underpin place-shapingplace- 
shaping in remote settlements. Drawing on a range of governance structures, a greater leaning towards less 
traditional Type II clubs and polity forming bodiesthe paper presents a framework for designing institutions 
which may better serve the interests of remote Australians.  
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The chronic continuity of a ‘geography of disadvantage’ impoversishment is well-documentedwell 
documented in Australian society, with its manifestation especially acute amongst Aboriginal people 
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in remote parts of the country (Haberkorn, Hugo, Fisher, and & Aylwar, 1999; ABS, 2010; Steering 
Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, 2011). Regional statistics show decisive 
differences between remote Australians living in the ‘bush’2 compared to the broader population. 
Aboriginal people in remote communities in particular are afflicted by poor educational outcomes, 
higher levels of disability and chronic diseases, low household and individual incomes, endemic child 
abuse and neglect, family and community violence, as well as imprisonment and juvenile detention 
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 While the focus of the manuscript is on inland Aboriginal people, reference to Aboriginal for simplicity can 
include Torres Strait Islander people as well, but this is not always the case.  
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 Remote Australia. While the focus of the paper is on inland Aboriginal people, reference to Aboriginal for 
simplicity can include Torres Strait Islander people as well, but this is not always the case.  
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(Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, 2011). While these problems 
are so entrenched that it would be hard to intervene effectively even under the most favourable 
circumstances, the paucity of democratic institutions of self-government in remote Australia make the 
task much more difficult.  
A potentially effective approach to community
3
 improvement resides in ‘place-shaping’. Whereas 
place-shaping as a developmental strategy was introduced into contemporary public policy by the 
Lyons’ Inquiry into Local Government (Lyons, 2007) in Britain, the concept already existed in the 
planning and institutional design literature (Healey, 1999). Furthermore, following the Lyon’s 
Inquiry, Van de Walle (2010) suggested that place-shaping followed similar processes to ‘nation 
building’ as conceived by Eisenstadt and Rokkan (1973). Place-shaping was defined in the Lyons’ 
Inquiry as follows: 
 
[T]he creative use of powers and influence to promote the general well-being of a community and its 
citizens. It includes the following components: (1) building and shaping local identity; (2) representing 
the community; (3) regulating harmful and disruptive behaviours; (4) maintaining the cohesiveness of 
the community and supporting debate within it, ensuring smaller voices are heard; (5) helping to 
resolve disagreements; (6) working to make the local economy more successful while being sensitive 
to pressures on the environment; (7) understanding local needs and preferences and making sure that 
the right services are provided to the right people; and (8) working with other bodies to reponse (sic) to 
complex challenges such as natural disasters and other emergencies. (Lyons, 2007, p. 3) 
 
In a groundbreakinggroundbreaking report, Fixing the Hole in Australia’s Heartland: How 
Government Needs to Work in Remote Australiathat constructively criticises the workings of 
government in remote Australia, Walker, Porter and Marsh (2012) summarise the views of remote 
Australians which have symmetry with the principles of place-shapingplace- shaping. People in 
remote Australia desired 1) the ability to influence decisions that affect them; 2) equitable and 
sustainable financial flows; 3) better services and locally responsive public services; 4) local control 
and accountability; and 5) inclusion in a greater Australian narrative. 
While Walker, Porter, and Marsh (2012) identify the need for reform in remote Australia and 
provide key institutional suggestions for moving forward, our work is different. Our work takes a 
necessary, initial step of reflecting on these theories in light of the problems remoteness brings (i.e. 
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 Community refers to the geospatial grouping of people within a relatively small but common local area such as 
towns and out-settlements. The dynamics at play in forming remote communities can be considerably different 
to non-remote locations as addressed in the final section of the manuscript. 
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the sui generis nature of remote Australia) to clear the way for more advanced stages of institutional 
and economic reforms. We begin by summarising each of the theories presented in Table 2 and their 
implications for place-shaping in remote Australia. 
A capstone for effective ‘bottom-up’ place-shapingplace- shaping resides in democratic 
institutions of self-government. Grant and Dollery (2010) have demonstrated that, in the context of 
developing countries, local government can play a pivotal role in place-shaping aimed at socio-
economic improvement, despite administrative and technical hurdles. However, the matter of which 
institution could fulfil this function in remote Australia poses a difficult question: How do the people 
of remote Australia, both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, many of whom fall outside the jurisdiction 
of representative local or regional governing institutions (Blackwell, 2012), best influence the social 
design of their ‘place’ in the absence of a democratically elected and accountable government?4 
Against the background of the characteristics of remote Australia, which compound the difficulties of 
effective developmental policy, this papermanuscript considers a range of institutions which could 
perform a role analogous to the standard functions of local government in locally driven ‘bottom-up’ 
place-shapingplace- shaping.  
The remainder of the paper is divided into four main parts. Section 2 provides a synoptic review of 
the characteristics of remote Australia. Section 3 discusses various institutions which could take 
responsibility for place-shaping in remote Australia. Section 4 provides examples of current 
institutions, some limitations and a discussion of the implications for place-shaping in remote 
Australia. 
 
2. CHARACTERISTICS OF REMOTE AUSTRALIA  
 
Settlements in Australia are described as remote
5
 where they are a considerable distance from 
major population centres and thus have limited or no access to the standard services. Using this logic, 
                                                             
4
 This is a very different but related issue to the normalization of closed or special purpose towns as discussed 
by Pearson (2012) and Robertson and Blackwell (forthcoming). 
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 Various definitions of remoteness exist. Here we focus on Australia’s definition using geographical remoteness 
from services. Other definitions include those of Leven (1986) such as economic remoteness which results from 
geographical, cultural and political remoteness. Geography’s term of sparsely populated areas has the 
characteristics of all three conditions (Dubios and Roto, 2012). 
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the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS, 2011a) has spatially grouped Australia into six classes of 
remoteness areas (RAs), employing the Accessibility-Remoteness Index of Australia (ARIA) 
(GISCA, 2011).: The RAs encompass major cities;, inner regional;, outer regional;, remote;, very 
remote;, and migratory.  
Figure 1 shows that much of the geographical area of the Australian continent is classified as 
either remote (lighter blueshading) or highly remote (darker blueshading). These combined areas 
represent around 75 percentper cent of the continent and contain three percentprecent of the 
population (Haslam McKenzie, 2011, p. 353). In Figure 1, very remote locations include Coober Pedy 
in South Australia; there are also pockets of non-remoteness in a ‘sea’ of remoteness, e.g., Darwin, 
Northern Territory (NT). Others like Alice Springs, NT stand out as remote areas in a ‘sea’ of very 
remote areas. The corollary is also interesting; pockets of remoteness in non-remote areas e.g. in the 
north east corner of NSW. 
------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 
------------------- 
Walker, Porter and Marsh (2012, p. 13) have vividly illustrated . Tthis unusual distribution of the 
population,  describing it has been vividly illustrated as the ‘Australian Archipelago’, in contrast with 
the ‘hole in Australia’s heartland’ as illustrated in Figure 2 by Walker, Porter and Marsh (2012, p. 13). 
The Australian Archipelago, wwith its its geographically small and separated areas, discretely 
abuttings relatively small proportions of Australia’s southern coast, but contains containing the vast 
majority of Australia’s population. In contrast, remote Australia contains a very small proportion of 
the population, but the vast mass of its geographical space, and natural resources, as well as 
havingand a greater representation of Aboriginal cultureand Torres Strait Islanders. The Archipeligo 
Archipelago thus operates as a separate and distinct entity from the ‘whole of Australia’ (Walker, 
Porter and & Marsh, 2012, p. 13) with little or no inclusion of remote Australians in a greater 
Australian narrative, such as through the shaping of their own places. At the heart of their analysis,, 
Walker Porter and Marsh (2012, pp. 13 and 9) point to current governance arrangements as the reason 
for the ‘(h)ole in Australia’s (h)eartland’, that is, the problems which afflict remote Australia. 
Similarly, Altman (2004) argues that the benefits of an Aboriginal ‘hybrid’ economy, the customary 
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sector, warrants institutional and property reform. While the debate continues as to whether 
geography or insititutions are the driver of economic development in remote areas (Dale, 2013; 
Regional Australia Institute, 2013; Huskey, 2006), we appositely argue, remoteness has brought with 
it poorly functioning governance arrangements, which typically manifest as problems. 
------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 
------------------- 
 
Problems Associated with Remoteness 
 
Because remoteness posses a number of problems
6
 for affected communities, it makes remediation 
through place-shaping much more difficult. The problems faced by remote communities can be 
categorised into four five cognate groups: institutional, environmental or geographical, health and 
wellbeing, cultural, and economic as outlined in Table 1. 
------------------- 
Insert Table 1 
------------------- 
In institutional terms, Blackwell (2012) has noted that the frequent absence of local government in 
remote areas and the attendant lack of administrative and technical expertise (an economic factor in 
Table 1), severely inhibit effective place making. Similarly, many remote locations have experienced 
low or even negative economic growth, and associated with this, high rates of unemployment (ABS, 
2010), further depressing local prospects (economic factor in Table 1).  
The geographical factors of the ‘tyranny of distance’ (Blackwell, 2012), isolation, harsh and 
extreme environments (Savvas, Boulton and & Jepsen, 2011), and limited or dispersed resources 
(Stafford Smith, 2008) also have numerous deleterious health and wellbeing, cultural, and economic 
effects. Economic deleterious effects of the tyranny of distance include limited or high-cost 
communication and transport networks (Blackwell, 2012), and ‘distant markets and decision-making’ 
(Stafford Smith, 2008, p. 3), often related to no local representative authority which can provide or 
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 While this papermanuscript focuses on the problems of remote communities, remote locations may also be 
attractive to people. In a related way, Altman (2004, p. 513) noted there may be significant local, regional and 
national benefits provided by an Aboriginal ‘hybrid’ economy, the customary sector, which need to be more 
actively supported by the state through institutional and property reform. 
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manage public services (Blackwell, 2012). Many of the standard national electricity and water 
networks are not available in remote Australia, requiring self sufficiency, innovation and resilience to 
provide enduring substitutes (e.g. hard rock water drilling techniques, Iga Warta, South Australia). 
Compounding these factors are the market failures of financing business in remote Australia and the 
increased risk of contagion from potential spiralling bad debts (Blackwell, 2014).  
Health and wellbeing in remote Australia areis poor, resulting from high levels of disease and 
limited access to much needed medical care (Gruen, Weeamanthi and Baille, 2002). Distance, 
communication and cultural inappropriateness have been highlighted as reasons why health services 
are not provided to remote people (Gruen, Weeamanthi and Baille, 2002). Further, according to 
Gruen, Weeamanthi and Baille (2002), the design of funding and coordination of health care does not 
encourage hospitals and primary care providers to take responsibility for remote service provision. 
Related issues are poor education and healthy water supplies. 
Stafford Smith (2008), Brown, Taylor and Bell (2008) and other writers have stressed the 
problems which flow from the cultural factors of sparse, mobile and patchy human populations. These 
include the limited nature and high cost (SCRGSP, 2012) of essential public services, such as health, 
education and water (‘Health and wellbeing’ in Table 1), as well as limited availability of human 
capital
7
 to provide the necessary or desired services (‘Economic’ in Table 1). 
Cultural factors may be critical in remote areas with a high proportion of Aboriginal residents (see 
Figure 3 2 which depicts the distribution of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Communities). For 
example, Stafford Smith (2008, p. 3) points to ‘limited research knowledge and persistent traditional 
and local knowledge’ and ‘widespread low and patchy primary productivity’. Low productivity has 
adverse economic consequences, including a discouragement of business location to remote Australia. 
Haslam McKenzie (2011) has established that attracting and retaining skilled and professional staff to 
remote Australia was very difficult for businesses because of a lack of housing, services and 
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 A counter argument to the limited social capital in remote Australia is that the social capital and resilience of Aboriginal 
communities for living in remote locations could be developed and has been lost as result of relocation, encampments, and 
traditional ways being substituted with western ways. A combination of traditional knowledge (e.g. arid plants providing 
nutritious foods) and latest western thinking (e.g. solar power) provides a bright future for remote Australia. 
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infrastructure (‘Economic factor’ in Table 1). Retaining young people is also difficult and for those 
youth who remain, a loss of friends can result in isolation, boredom and further social ills (Guerin and 
Guerin, 2010).  
------------------- 
Insert Figure 32 
------------------- 
Similarly, cultural differences (Stafford Smith, 2008) derived from the wide variety of peoples, 
cultures, languages and institutions can spark conflict (Blackwell, 2012). Along analogous lines, 
social dislocation related to, or resulting from, removal of people from their traditional lands has seen 
the rise of chronic drug and alcohol abuse, as well as other social ills, such as domestic violence, child 
abuse, and high rates of arrest and imprisonment (Savvas, Boulton and Jepsen, 2011). In short, many 
remote communities are best characterised as being in a state of ill-being rather than wellbeing (see, 
for instance, Sorensen, Marshall and Dollery, 2007).  
Implicit in the above discussion is that many of the difficulties faced by remote people are 
interacting and confounding (Blackwell, 2012), bringing further complexity and difficulty to place-
shaping through policy turbulence and instability (Walker, Porter and Marsh, 2012). A holistic 
approach, where governance arrangements take account of these complex, synergistic and cumulative 
problems provides a source of remedy. 
In providing a remedy, the priority of factors is important because foundation factors can drive a 
syndrome across all groups (Stafford Smith, 2008). For example, social variability through 
unpredictability in, or lack of control over, markets, labour and policy can reinforce a sparse human 
population, returning and driving further social variability (Stafford Smith, 2008). Governance 
arrangements are emerging as a key area of fault and requiring reform. For example, Blackwell (2012) 
has identified that the current heterogeneous patchwork of institutions in remote Australia is far from 
a satisfactory form of governance.; Moreover, Walker, Porter and Marsh (2012) have identified 
governance arrangements as the key to Fixing the Hole in Australia’s Heartland fixing the problems 
afflicting remote Australia, and Dale (2013) and the Regional Australia Institute (2013) focus on 





3. INSTITUTIONAL VEHICLES  
 
The questions of which institutions could play an effective role in place-shaping, and more 
importantly, in the absence of local democratic arrangements, how they might be adequately 
conceptualised are not easily answered. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a range of theoretical 
approaches to governance arrangements which could be useful. Likely candidates comprise multi-
level governance (Baker, Hudson and Woodward, 2005), polycentric governance (McGinnis, 1999), 
multi-perspectival governance (Hooghe and Marks, 2003), functional overlapping competing 
jurisdictions (FOCJ: Frey and Eichenberger, 1999) and fragmegration (Rosenau, 2003). The key 
elements of these theories are summarised in Table 2.  
------------------- 
Insert Table 2 
------------------- 
While Walker, Porter, and Marsh (2012) identify the need for reform in remote Australia and 
provide key institutional suggestions for moving forward, our work is different. Our work takes a 
necessary, initial step of reflecting on these theories in light of the problems remoteness brings (i.e. 
the sui generis nature of remote Australia) to clear the way for more advanced stages of institutional 
and economic reforms. We begin by summarising each of the theories presented in Table 2 and their 




Multi-level governance (MLG) is an analytical framework that attempts to capture the ‘totality of 
political relationships in the world through recognising a range of actors at many different levels’ 
(Baker, Hudson and Woodward, 20054, p. 11). One imperfect depiction of MLG for global financial 
systems is outlined in Table 3., Table 3which shows there are successive layers and geographical 
boundaries to an institution’s jurisdiction e.g. UN, APEC etc. While Baker, Hudson and Woodward 
(2004) suggest that Table 3 is simplistic, it helps recognise: 1) that human interaction and 
communities exist at a number of different levels beyond the two standard distinctions (Baker, 
Hudson and Woodward 2005);; and 2) the central role of state governments, but also their dependency 
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on other governments, supranational, transnational and sub-state actors for decision making and 
authority; and . 
Baker, Hudson and Woodward (2004, p. 12) go on to identify the shortcomings of existing 
perspectives of MLG:  
13) it is more than ‘formal, public structures of authority’ and includes athe multitude of actors 
such as private, market and other ‘non-territorial forms of authority’ (Baker, Hudson and Woodward 
20054, p. 13); 
------------------- 
Insert Table 3 
------------------- 
------------------- 
Table 3 shows there are successive layers and geographical boundaries to an institution’s 
jurisdiction e.g. UN, APEC etc. While Baker, Hudson and Woodward (2004) suggest that Table 3 is 
simplistic, it helps recognise 1) that human interaction and communities exist at a number of different 
levels beyond the two standard distinctions; and 2) the central role of state governments, but also their 
dependency on other governments, supranational, transnational and sub-state actors for decision 
making and authority. 
Baker, Hudson and Woodward (2004, p. 12) go on to identify the shortcomings of existing 
perspectives of MLG:  
1) it is more than ‘formal, public structures of authority’ and includes a multitude of actors such as 
private, market and other ‘non-territorial forms of authority’ (Baker, Hudson and Woodward 2004, p. 
13);  
2) the levels present more than simply a hierarchical or ‘territorial view’ but ‘overlain... functional, 
sectional, socially... constructed spatial forms’ with actors operating at a number of different not 
necessarily authorised levels;  
3) levels can be better described as ‘concentric circles’, ‘layers’ (Baker, Hudson and Woodward, 
2004, p. 194) or ‘dimensions... clustered around locational co-ordinating mechanisms’ e.g. the state, 
multilateral process or market place (Baker, 2004, p. 95);  
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4) actors can cut across multiple layers, providing a better appreciation of how layers are 
constructed and how successful governance is delivered from within a level (Woodward, 2004; 
Grossman, 2004);  
5) MLG can go beyond the positive analysis to consider ‘the values that should underpin 
governance, and the interests that should be represented’ (Baker, Hudson and Woodward, 2004, p. 14) 
By identifying that authority can emanate from institutions outside the state, MLG recognises the 
importance that individuals, communities, non-government organisations, and corporations can make 
in shaping places. By identifying the ‘governors’ and the ‘governed’ and the impacts of governors, 
MLG has the potential to provide an analytical framework to ensure place-shapingplace- shaping is a 
democratic process (Langley, 20042005). In remote Australia, these frameworks are particularly 
relevant, given the compounding state, corporate, individual and community interests at play and the 
lack of democracy (Blackwell, 2012).  
In addition, the current impoverished state of remote Australia would suggest that influences from 
outside remote locations have not been completely successful in alleviating their problems. The MLG 
view allows for the different influences on place-shapingplace- shaping to be considered including the 
influence that trans and supranational actors, government, corporate and non-government 
organisations, and communities and individuals may play. What is required is a ‘focus on the 
interactive and mutually reinforcing relationships between different levels, as well as the net 




Polycentric governance (PG) is a ‘networks form of governance in democratic societies’ 
(McGinnis and Ostrom, 2011, p.15) that requires multiple levels of organisations drawn from the 
state, private, and voluntary sectors which have overlapping responsibility and functional capacities. 
PG mandates an important role for local solutions to complex policy problems. 
 
The basic idea is that any group of individuals facing collective action problems should be able to 
address that problem in whatever way they best see fit. To do so, they might work through the existing 
system of public authorities, or they might establish a new governance unit that would impose taxes on 
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members of that group in order to achieve some common purpose (McGinnis and Walker, 2010, p. 
293).  
 
PG is much more than simply a federal system of ‘neatly nested’ local, provincial and national 
jurisdictions; it also has ‘cross cutting jurisdictions specialising in particular policy matters’ 
(McGinnis and Ostrom, 2011, p.15). Further, ‘corporations, voluntary associations, and community-
based organisations play critical supporting roles in a polycentric system of governance, even where 
they have not been assigned public roles in an official manner’ (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2011, p.15). 
Local solutions are therefore critical to addressing complex policy problems, which are sometimes 
at odds with large scale governmental intervention through society and ‘nearly in all sectors of the 
economy’ according to McGinnis and Walker (2010, p. 295). Polycentric governance can ‘nurture and 
sustain the self-governing capabilities of local communities’, ‘that allow for significant but not perfect 
levels of cooperation’ (McGinnis and Walker, 2010, p. 299). McGinnis and Walker (2010, p. 295) 
argue that the empirical evidence that efficient public services can be provided by overlapping and 
multiple jurisdictions is not just constrained to the urban centres of the developed world (inter alia 
Functional Overlapping and Competing Jurisdictions, FOCJ) but can be extended with success to 
some of the ‘poorest regions in the world’. 
The Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, which set the work in motion for 
developing PG, provides an indication as to PG’s usefulness in place-shapingplace- shaping: 
 
Scholars associated with Ostrom Workshop have used ... (various) methods to study conditions under 
which communities can use their shared understandings, normative expectations, and strategic 
opportunities to sustainably manage resources critical to their own survival. (McGinnis, 2011, p. 57) 
 
In these ways PG is much like MLG and the characteristics of PG are very similar also to those of 
FOCJ (as are discussed next in this section) especially by being a normative form of governance but 
also practical. MLG in contrast appears to be a framework for understanding the polycentricity of 






FOCJs are jurisdictions that deliver a particular function, overlap geographically, compete with 
similar institutions to provide efficiency gains, and are able to collect taxes from beneficiaries to fund 
their operations (Frey and Eichenberger, 1999).  
Central to the idea of FOCJ is a requirement for political competition: 
 
[T]he institutional conditions have to be designed so that stronger incentives are imposed on politicians 
and governments to fulfil citizen’s preferences. This can only be achieved by strengthening the political 
competition at all levels of government. Strong political competition makes governments suppliers of 
policies that take care of citizen’s demands and thus increase welfare... Nevertheless political 
competition has often been disregarded (Frey and Eichenberger, 1999, p. 3). 
 
In a similar vein to MLG, PG, FOCJ are not hindered by arbitrary territorial monopoly (Frey, 
2001). ‘These jurisdictions are formed according to the geography of problems, i.e. by the citizens 
seeking to cope with issues with which they are confronted’ (Eichenberger and Frey, 2006, p. 26). 
Thus, FOCJ allow for the ‘emergence of political bodies whose size corresponds to the tasks to be 
fulfilled’; the geographical extension of individual FOCJ (FOCUS) being ‘driven by the present and 
future physical extension of a problem rather than by historical, more or less randomly established, 
boundaries’ (Frey and Eichenberger, 1999, p. 3).  
The formation of FOCUS by citizens seeking to cope with particular issues is at the heart of any 
application to place-shapingplace- shaping for people in remote Australia. The limitations of this 
urban focussed theory to remote Australia however is problematic and is therefore given special 




Fragmegration refers to ‘the complex interactions between the fragmenting forces of localisation 
and integrative forces of globalisation’ (Winters, 2004, p. 1). T The term was introduced by Rosenau 
(2003) in his magnum opus, Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalisation. 
The theory represents an attempt to humanize governance arrangements such that individuals can 
gain agency by understanding the ‘macro and micro interactions’ in governance arrangements 
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(Winters, 2004, p. 285). By recognising Tthese macro-micro interactions are critical to appreciating 
that ‘people count...  becausethat ‘all... actions originate with individuals who may then form 
aggregate entities that engage in salient behaviour’ (Rosenau, 2007, p. 308).  
With the advent of globalisation, Rosenau (2005) argues that tUsing globalisation as the case study 
phenomenon, the key features of Rosenau’s (2005) analysis are that there are eight sources of 
fragmegration at four different levels of aggregation forming a matrix as shown in Figure Table 44. 
The four levels of aggregation in Figure 4, are noted as column headings and the eight sources of 
fragmegration are depicted as row headings in Table 4 and are briefly defined in the row cellsare: A1) 
the micro level of individuals; A2) the macro level of collectives and states; A3) the micro-macro 
level at which individuals and collectives shape and interact with each other; and A4) the macro-
micro level wherein collectives interact and influence each other.  
------------------- 
Insert Figure Table 44 
------------------- 
The eight sources of fragmegration depicted in Figure 4 as row headings are: F1) skill revolution; 
F2) organisational explosion; F3) bifurcation of global structures; F4) mobility upheaval; F5) 
weakening of territories, states and sovereignty; F6) authority crisis; F7) globalisation of national 
economies; and F8) microelectronic technologies. These sources are very briefly defined in the rows 
of Figure 4 are further detailed by Rosenau (2005; 2007). 
The importance of fragmegration to place-shapingplace- shaping is that it provides a framework 
for aligning the forces at the global scale with the local scale and makes people accountable by 
indentifyingidentifying these links. It also provides encouragement to individuals to act on collective 
action dilemmas, as they can see that their close handlocal actions may affect some distant 
circumstance and vice versa. This is important for people in remote communities, who are distant and 
feel disempowered to make change. While powers from outside a local community may attempt to 
make change, it is individuals first who must desire and put into action change that then provides a 
collective groundswell. Individuals are therefore empowered to shape their places given the analytical 






Hooghe and Marks (2003) build on the theories of MLG and PG to provide a structure for how 
governance should be organised. Drawing on Hooghe and Marks (2003), Dollery, Buultjens and 
Adams (2011) discuss the ‘New Perspectives of Regional Governance’ to identify for Australia the 
application of the two types of MLG: Type I; and Type II. Table 4 5 outlines the characteristics of 
these two types of MLG. 
------------------- 
Insert Table 45 
------------------- 
As summarised in Table 45, Type I governance involves jurisdictions that have a general purpose, 
delivering a range of public goods and services. In contrast, Type II entities are task specific, e.g., 
police patrolling, while Type I jurisdictional membership does not overlap with other memberships, 
e.g., state jurisdictions in Australia. Type I governance also has a limit on the number of jurisdictions. 
In contrast, Type II has no limit on the number of jurisdictions because these are driven by the 
spillovers they create or the negative externalities they extinguish, capitalising on the efficiencies of 
their specific task. The system-wide architecture of Type I governance is inflexible and usually based 
on arbitrary boundaries which drive monopolistic returns. In contrast, Type II jurisdictions tend to be 
‘lean and flexible’, adapting ‘to the demands for governance change’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2011, p. 
18). 
Dollery, Buultjens and Adams (2011) argue that in practice, rather than seeing explicit examples at 
the extremes of these two types of governance, they manifest in mixed forms. The Australian 
Constitution is an example of the durable, system wide architecture of Type I governance in Australia, 
with discrete powers from the federated states relinquished to the Commonwealth.  
At a more local level, households also rely on Type I institutions for necessary public services: 
Melbournians buy their water from Melbourne Water, receive police patrol protection from the 
Victorian Police Force, catch train services provided by Metro and so on. Each of these institutions 
provides a ‘well defined service over a distinct spatial area’ (Dollery, Buultjens and Adams, 2011, p. 
247). However, these institutions do not necessarily have to compete against similar jurisdictions for 
their customers; unlike the strict definition of FOCJ and Type II entities. The other distinguishing 
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A further clarifying issue for determining the application of Type I and II entities in remote 
Australia is the idea of ‘jurisdictional integrity’ developed by Skelcher (2005). Jurisdictional integrity 
refers to the ‘legal and political competence’ of Type I and II entities ‘to operate in a spatial and 
functional realm’ (Skelcher, 2005, p. 89). Table 5 6 outlines the key components to jurisdictional 
integrity of Type I and II entities broken into ‘boundary integrity’ and ‘relational integrity’. Boundary 
integrity refers to the external integrity or ‘degree of autonomy over a defined spatial and policy 
domain’ (Dollery, Buultjens and Adams, 2011, p. 249) while relational integrity is ‘a measure of the 
democratic relationship between the governmental body and the citizenry it services’ (Skelcher, 2005, 
p. 93).  
------------------- 
Insert Table 6 
------------------- 
 
High boundary integrity means that public policy issues which overlap and intersect jurisdictions, 
such as with remote development policy, result in failure of Type I entities where ‘mainstream 
governmental organisations are unable to respond flexibly’ (Skelcher, 2005, p. 94). This failure is also 
the case for Agency Type II entities where boundary constraints are also high – see the first row of 
Table 56. This means that in remote development policy Type I and II entities, especially clubs and 
polity forming bodies with low or medium bounded integrity, ideally co-exist alongside each other. 
This dual existence marries with a competency constraint in the second row of Table 5 6 with a 
flexible response to intersecting jurisdictional issues. Intersecting jurisdictional issues exist where 
‘interjurisdictional externalities play a significant role’ and where economies of scale and democratic 
processes are required, and constituents are unable to ‘vote with their feet’ (Skelcher, 2005, p. 94).  
Examples of the need for institutions with more flexible responses to intersect jurisdictional 
governance structures, where people can shape their own places include: calls for a north Australian 
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state (Freebairn, 2013) and the perverse incentives for ecotourism buildings to be stilted, without 
foundations, on Indigenous Protected Land (e.g. Iga Warta, South Australia). 
Table 5 6 briefly defines the integrity characteristics of three type II institutions: clubs
8
, agencies 
and polity forming bodies. Type II entities are formed in various ways. Members help form a club in a 
bottom-up approach; government forms an agency in a top-down approach much like Type I entities 
but at ‘arms length’. A polity forming body can be created by a mixture of government, business or 
individual resourcing. Type I entities along with polity forming bodies typically deliver on a range of 
public policy issues, while clubs and agencies address quite specific public policy issues.  
------------------- 
Insert Table 5 
------------------- 
The constituency of Type I entities is relatively undefined, while for Type II entities the 
membership ranges from exclusive for a club to moderately defined for an agency and well defined 
locally or regionally for a polity body. The membership and public policy scope of the entity 
determines its legitimacy. For example, a Type I entity obtains its legitimacy from the electoral 
system which votes in a responsible Minister or representative who is responsible for a portfolio of 
public policy issues. The legitimacy of Type II entities is somewhat different with the shared benefits 
to members being the reason for a club’s existence; a polity body through popular participation; and 
an agency through government mandate.  
Consent to undertake particular action is provided to Type I entities through the election of a 
representative acting on behalf of constituents. Clubs take action on matters of interest of their 
members, agencies through a board, and polity bodies through a deliberative approach between their 
board and the corresponding constituency.  
Type I entities are accountable through their Ministers as elected representatives of voters, while 
clubs through their members on the basis of an implicit and individual benefit-cost basis. Those who 
see the costs of membership being greater than the benefits will not join. Agencies are accountable to 
                                                             
8
 Clubs include the conventional form, e.g. sports, associations and societies, but also a broad range of club 
goods and services which are non-rival but exclusive as postulated by Buchanan (1956). 
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government through their performance while polity bodies are accountable to their constituency and 
performance in changing public policy or effecting change. 
 
4. POTENTIAL OF PLACE-SHAPING INSTITUTIONS FOR REMOTE AUSTRALIA 
 
In the previous section of this paper we considered to some degree the applicability of these 
theories of governance to remote Australia and their potential for helping to shape places. A central 
tenant of the institutions presented in the previous section and their importance to place- shapingse 
theories  is that local people have the ability to shape their own places, whether or not they command 
the formal authority to do so. N; new structures of governance, particularly Type II entities and 
FOCUS, are available to them through the development of the phenomenon of Fragmegration and 
especially the theories of FOCJ and MPG. Here we investigate this possibility further by considering 
examples of governance in remote Australia, provide some economic limitations and solutions on the 
operation of Type II and FOCJ governance, and then provide a final discussion. 
 
Examples of Governance in Remote Australia 
 
Better known examples of MPG Type I entities include the Commonwealth, state and local 
governments in Australia. Type II entities include the Regional Organisations of Councils, the Murray 
Darling Basin Authority, and Regional Development Australia as examples of a club, an agency, and 
a polity forming body respectively (Dollery, Buultjens and Adams, 2011).  
Examples of Type I and II entities in remote Australia are less well known compared with those in 
regional and urban Australia (Dollery, Buultjens and Adams, 2011). Remote rural councils provide 
services normally produced by state agencies such as aged care, as well as services usually provided 
by private firms, like banking facilities and funeral parlours (Dollery, Wallis and Akimov, 2010; 
Dollery, Buultjens and Adams, 2011, p. 247). Remote rural councils are expected to provide such 
services where there is demand from constituents and a lack of supply from the private sector. 
However, often the cost of provision is prohibitive or assumed so. In some cases however, these 
publicly provided services compete with and supplement any private sector provision, as is the nature 
of FOCJs and Type II jurisdictions. Partially competing private and public schools are an example of 
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this, with reduced private sector competition as one moves from the geospatial scale of regional to 
remote Australia.  
Examples of Type I entities directly operating in remote Australia include the local land councils 
formed under state or territory legislation e.g. the Central Land Council formed under the Aboriginal 
Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 where 90 Aboriginal representatives are elected by 
communities in the southern half of the Northern Territory . The Central Land Council (2012) 
provides a number of legal, advocacy and social and cultural services for the benefit of traditional 
owners and other Aboriginal residents of the CLC region. 
A Type II entity example of a club in remote Australia is the Aboriginal youth development 
program of the Warlpiri people in the Northern Territory (Warlpiri Youth Development Aboriginal 
Corporation, 2012). The program was first established in 1993 by the community to overcome the 
chronic interjurisdictional problem of petrol sniffing. Since then the program has broadened its scope, 
having a flexible system wide and bottom up architecture, and now features a number of community 
based youth development programs, a mechanics training workshop, a community swimming pool, 
and a counselling and mentoring service. Its success therefore lies in its low boundary integrity but 
compensating high relational integrity with its people. Also, this institution has the central tenant 
common with the European experience of place- shaping, where local people have increased 
ownership and delivery of services to their own local people they represent and who are in need. 
An example of a Type II agency is the Outback Communities Authority (OCA, 2010). The 
Authority which acts as an agent for the South Australian Government, overcoming the 
interjurisdictional externality of the absence of local government by providing key essential services 
to a vast unincorporated area in the North West corner of the state. This The agencyOCA, being 
developed from top down, has responsibilities to ‘manage and promote improvements in the provision 
of public services and facilities to outback communities’ and to ‘articulate the views, interests and 
aspirations of outback communities’ (OCA, 2010, website, no page number). The agencies OCA’s 
existence lies in a high boundary integrity yet low relational integrity compared to the 
WalpiriWarlpiri example provided above. Also, itsthe OCA’s objectives of articulating the views, 
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interests and aspirations of remote communities, is a far cry from full-blown place- shaping and 
making through Type II clubs or polity forming bodies. 
Finally, the Tanami Regional Partnership Agreement in the Northern Territory provides an 
example of a polity forming body combined with an Agency. The partnership is between the territory, 
Commonwealth, local governments, the Central Land Council (on behalf of a number of local 
Aboriginal communities), and Newmont Mining Corporation (Indigenous Studies Program, 2011). 
The partnership, developed to overcome the interjurisdictional issues of problems faced by remote 
Aboriginal people and the social license required for mining companies, has the goal of sharing 
‘responsibility for achieving measurable and sustainable improvements for Aboriginal people, with a 
particular focus on employment and business development’ (Newmont, 2008, p. 73). This final 
example,example is not wholly a polity forming body because it is not accountable to a constituency 
on the basis of democratic process but is mildly accountable by way of policy achievement through its 
agency linkages. There is some coincidental evidence that this agreement appears to have mildly 
helped in employing local Aboriginal people; using Australian Bureau of Statistics (2014) 
TableBuilder Pro interface, we found nine local Aboriginal people employed in gold mining in the 
Central Dessert LGA in 2011, representing about seven percentper cent of all local people employed 
in gold mining in the region (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2014see Blackwell, McFarlane and 
Blake, forthcoming, for the methods used in obtaining these estimates). In summary, the agreement 
provides an example of mild relational and boundary integrities, with mild local but not fully 




The analytical frameworks established through the governance theories outlined in this 
papermanuscript overlook two key economic problems associated with the provision of public goods 
in remote Australia: first, the insurmountable cost of providing public goods to remote communities; 
second the ‘free rider’ problem. FOCJ, PG and, and Type II institutions remain viable in a potentially 
competitive and overlapping service environment by spreading the large capital costs of provision 
across a larger populated urban community. These institutions may even be able to be extended to the 
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poorest urban regions of the world as stated by McGinnis and Walker (2010). In remote Australia, 
however, the constituency is considerably smaller in number with , the tyranny of distance 
compounding the high costs of provision per person. In these cases the efficiency gains prescribed to 
FOCJ these alternative forms of governance and the ability of people to choose between overlapping 
or competing jurisdictions is are questionable
9
.  
The second problem is that Bby their economic nature, public goods or public services struggle to 
be provided by people from a community because of the existence of free riding. Why provide a 
service for which one will receive nothing in return and others will use without contribution to the 
cost of provision? Many public services are non-excludable; all people in the community receive the 
service but cannot be feasibly charged individually for their use. Therefore, the provision of public 
goods or services tends to fail and this is the central argument for some form of government 
intervention. The governance theories outlined above ignore the this issue of free riding and its 
inherent reason for government intervention. 
 For these two reasons and in very troubling and intersecting jurisdictional issues in remote 
Australia we see mixed Type II solutions such as the Tanami Regional Partnership Agreement to help 
with shaping places.  
Other solutions are also possible but only where national governments are willing to relinquish 
some of their territorial sovereignty to outside jurisdictions. For example, the United Nations and non-
government institutions like The Nature Conservancy work with developing nation states to overcome 
problems for their people of free riding, poaching and excess costs of provision, in establishing and 
managing conservation reserves in remote locations. The disparate roles of the Gundjeihmi Aboriginal 
Corporation, Energy Resources Australia Ranger mine, and the Australian Government in establishing 
the town of Jabiru, Kakadu National Park with concession to World Heritage Listing, and issuance of 
uranium mining leases inside the park, provide another example. 
                                                             
9
 Having said that, there is no reason why two people from a remote community could not join as a polity 
forming body (see Type II entity in MPG section) and lobby government, business, individuals, or other entities 
to resource the provision of an essential public service. 
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While these possibilities are marred to some degree by the transaction costs indentified alluded to 
by Marks and Hooghe Hooghe and Marks (20002003)
10
 as the coordination dilemma, FOCJs have the 
benefits of being functional and not permanent, evolving with the demands of communities. This 
advantage reflects their increased relational and reduced boundary integrities. Where the transaction 
costs are too high or national states deny relinquishing their sovereignty, some form of state 
intervention, through a central Australian agency, a Productivity Commission Inquiry, and innovation 
regions and zones, may offer a solution as suggested by (Walker, Porter and & Marsh, (2012). The 
central Australian agency would represent a Type II institution with lower relational integrity but 
higher than for one based in Canberra. A commissioned inquiry may help to overcome some of the 
information asymmetries around efficiently providing economic stimulus to remote Australia and, as 
part of this, provide a pathway for implementing Type II institutions and incentives. Innovation 
regions and zones are one type of incentive to raise investment in remote Australia, but this may often 
have pernicious and unintended consequences as a result of their initial distortionary effects e.g. the 
social consequences of stranded assets of failed water infrastructure. 
A particular strength in our institutional approach to uncovering the problems in remote Australia 
is that it is the structural characteristics of the local economy that builds resilience in remote places. 
Huskey (2011) identifies these characteristics as: 1) diversification even within small industries; 2) 
fixed community assets, physical and human; 3) a local market, both from local resource activities, 
government transfers, and a separate export market; 4) social, politicial and market entrepreneurs that 
drive change in the face of shocks; and 5) locally oriented political power. Analogous with concepts 
of European based place-shapingplace- shaping but as applied in remote parts of North America 
Huskey (2011, p. 5) states: 
 
                                                             
10
 Hooghe and Marks (2003) refer to the ‘co-ordination dilemma’ which results as the number of jurisdictions 
increases, coordinating the functions of these jurisdictions becomes complex and costly. At the same time, self 
determined jurisdictional functions, as provided by the desires of a place’s people (e.g. through club and polity 
body Type II entities), mean less of a co-ordinating requirement. 
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It may be more important for small remote regions to gain local control over decisions that affect their 
residents. Local control allows local residents to set the rules that determine the consequences of the 
use of regional resources. Increased control will limit the challenges posed by decisions made outside 
the region which affect local resource use.  
 
With small, sparsely distributed populations, remote community political power is usually quite 
limited. However, the relational integrity of Type II institutions vehiculatesvehicles place-shaping 
because through these institutions, local people have the political power to drive change. Removing 




Where does that leave Australians for place-shaping and making in remote locations, especially 
given the context of their difficulties, the limitations of governance theories but also any benefits or 
synergies from their people’s comparative advantage of heterogeneous tastes and characteristics? 
Don’t these heterogeneous characteristics and the sui generis of remote Australia demand a greater 
leaning to the role of ‘place-shaping’ and the benefits provided by Type II governance, and PG, MLG, 
FOCJ, and Fragmegration?  
Obviously there is a need for self-determination and a liberalisation of governance structures such 
as those provided by Type II entities. However, the lesson from Hooghe and Marks (2003) and 
Dollery, Buultjens and Adams (2011) is that Type I and II governance entities exhibit different 
comparative institutional advantages and are complimentary rather than... ... substitute systems co-
existing in all multi-level governance systems ). As seen above, there is thus a number of relatively 
fluctuating, self-contained, flexible yet functionally different, Type II jurisdictions alongside a more 
constant cohort of general purpose, nested Type I jurisdictions available to policy makers.  
Having said this, the current mix of Type I and II governance structures does not appear to have 
been successful in raising the wellbeing of remote Australians and particularly the wellbeing of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders. One reason for the lack of success maybe an over reliance on 
Type I institutions such as the role that the Commonwealth plays in central Australian affairs through 
the Northern Territory. Examples include the provision of national parks, the regulation and taxation 
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of uranium mining and what has been known as ‘the intervention’ on cultural affairs (see the Northern 
Territory National Emergency Response Act 2007 (Cwlth) and Altman, 2007) or more recently as 
Stronger Futures in The Northern TerrritoryTerritory, (Australian Government, 2013). These type I 
interventions do not deal well with intersecting jurisdictional issues. Because of their low relational 
integrity but high boundary integrity, these interventions are frustrated by co-ordination dilemmas and 
transaction costs, creating further external costs for the distant people who wish to shape their own 
places. 
Part of theFurther reasoning for this lack of success may lie at the heart of these theories in the 
coordination dilemma and the externalities created by Type I institutions.For example, Hhistorically, 
the collecting and relocation of Aboriginal people into settlements was done to provide access to 
essential services such as education and food (e.g. the establishment of Yuendumu as ration station; 
see Musharbash, 2009). This however was not driven by the people themselves and had dislocating 
consequences: a loss of self determinationself-determination, heritage, traditional ways and languages, 
a loss of mobility and a movement to a sedentary existence with reduced use of their lands, and 
waters. Ultimately the implementation of this Type I governance externalized rather than internalised 
‘place-shaping’ for these people of remote Australia.  
A return to place-shaping by local people, with support for adaptive and responsive jurisdictions 
from appropriate Type II agencies, may well be the simple solution to for what is a wicked problem. 
Being aware of the different types and characteristics of these institutions and their possibilities in 
practice shows there are great things ahead for remote Australians can hold some degree of optimism 
for an improved future. The policy suggestions by of Walker, Porter and Marsh (2012) for a central 
Australian agency, a Productivity Commission Inquiry, and innovation regions and zones may allow 
the budding of further club, polity and FOCJ success for the people of remote Australia, providing 
them with some hope of greater relational integrity in shaping their places. 
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Figure 2. The Australian Archipelago and the Whole of Australia. Source: Walker, Porter and Marsh, 














Table 1: Remoteness Problems. Sources and notes: a. Blackwell. 2012; b. Gruen, Weeamanthi and 
Baille, 2002; c. Stafford Smith, 2008; d. Queensland Treasury and Trade, 2011; e. Savvas, Boulton 
and Jepsen, 2011; f. Walker, Porter and Marsh, 2012; g. Steering Committee for Review of 
Government Service Provision (SCRGSP), 2012; h. ABS, 2010; i. Brown, Taylor and Bell, 2008; j. 
e.g. Altman, 2004; k. Barker, 2012; l. ABS, 2011b; m. SCRGSP, 2011; n. Guerin and Guerin, 2010; 
o. McKenzie, 2011; p. Blackwell (2014) other items developed as part of this papermanuscript. 
Institutional factors Environmental / 
geographical 
factors 
Health and wellbeing 
factors 








High levels of disease and 
limited access (distance, 
communication and 
cultural inappropriateness) 
to medical care b 
Social variability: 
unpredictability in or 
lack of control over 
markets, labour and 
policy c 
Very restricted or very 
little access to goods 
and services d i.e. 
‘distant markets’ c 
Distant decision 
making c 
Isolation  Funding and coordination 
of healthcare that does not 
recognise responsibilities 
to both hospitals and the 
primary care sector b 
Very restricted or 
very little access 
opportunities for 
social interaction d 
Limited human capital a 
e.g. lack of 
administrative and 
technical expertise to 
provide public services 
Limited 
management and 
provision of public 
services f 
Harsh and extreme 
environments, 
mostly arid climate 
e 
Limited and high cost 
education g, housing g h , 
community health g and 
water 
Sparse, mobile and 
patchy human 
populations c i 
Low or negative 
economic growth  
Unreconciled 
parochial and 
general interests f 




food and water) c 
Low levels of ATSI 
participation in the 
workforce j and education k 
Limited research 
knowledge c 
High unemployment g 
A highly complex 
political economy 
through formal and 
informal 
governance i  
 High proportion of 
disadvantaged people e.g. 
ATSI h 
Persistent traditional 
and local knowledge 
c 




and instability f 
 In parts, chronic drug and 
alcohol abuse m 
Cultural differences 
can create conflict c 
Disconnect from 
national/state or 
regional networks such 
as electricity and water 
a 
Poor property rights 
j 
 Domestic violence and 
child abuse m 





 In parts, higher rates of 
arrest and imprisonment e 
Inability to keep 
young people and 
resulting boredom for 
those who remain n 
Inability to attract and 
retain skilled and 
professional staff 
because of inadequate, 













Table 2. Modern theories of governance structure. Source: The Authors (2013) 
Theory Central tenant Positive/Normative (P/N) Meaning for Place-shaping 
and Remote Australia (RA) 
Multi-level governance 
(MLG) 
Multiple players across 
multiple levels; reduced 
hierarchical boundedness 
Positive but criticisms drive 
theory to move to normative 
Allows analysis of actors’ 
impacts to identify authority & 
responsibility paucity in RA 
Polycentric governance 
(PG) 
Network form of governance 
in democratic societies 
Predominantly normative 
drawing on positive analysis 
Local solutions are critical to 





Provides for competitive 
rigour in the provision of 
local public goods 
Predominantly normative Free rider and diseconomies of 
scale problems may prevent 
existence of FOCJs in RA 
Fragmegration Individual and collective 
interactions can be analysed 
at all levels, micro to macro 
Normative and Positive Provides a powerful tool for 
analysis of the effects of distant 
events on proximate realities 
Multi-perspectival 
governance (MPG) 
Identifies two contrasting 
governance types: Type I and 
Type II 
Positive and Normative Can draw on a range of 







Table 3. Multi-level governance. Source: Adapted from Hirst and Thompson (1999) 
Level 
Group of three (EU, North America, Japan) 
International Regulatory Authorities (WTO, IMF, World Bank, UN etc.) 
Regional-level governance (EU, APEC etc.) 
National-level governance (United States of America, Australia) 







Table 44. Eight Fragmegration Sources at Four Aggregation Levels. Source: Summary of Rosenau, 
2005; 2007. 











1. Skill revolution People link distant events with proximate circumstances 
2. Organisational 
explosion 
New in/formal organisations created at community & world levels 
3. Bifurcation of global 
structures 
Flourishing innumerable actors other than states after WWII 
4. Mobility upheaval Vast & rapid movement of people, e.g. people overboard, Timor Sea 
5. Weakening of 
territories, states & 
sovereignty 
As 7 other forces take affect 
6. Authority crisis Authority structures are undergoing disaggregation, e.g. Churches, Government 
7. Globalisation of 
national economies 
Free enterprise economic systems & reduced trade barriers 
8. Microelectronic 
technologies 





Table 5. Characteristics of Type I and II multilevel governance. Source: Adaption of Hooghe and 
Marks (2003, p. 236, Table 2). 
Characteristic Type I Type II  
Jurisdiction General purpose  Task specific  
Membership Non-intersecting  Intersecting  
Jurisdiction levels A limited number  No limit on the number 






Table 6. Jurisdictional integrity of Type I and II entities. Source: Development of Skelcher (2005, p. 
98, Table 2) and Dollery, Buultjens and Adams (2011, p. 250, Table 3). 
Integrity Characteristic Type I entity Type II entity 
Club Agency Polity forming body 
Boundary 
Integrity 







Inflexible  Flexible Inflexible Flexible 
Relational 
Integrity 












 Public Policy 
delivery 
General Specific Specific General 






 Legitimacy Electoral system Member benefits Government 
mandate 
Popular participation 




















basis of democratic 
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